Ž
. Ž Though we found it difficult to follow Binmore's 1996 critique hencew x. Ž .Ž w x. w x forth B of Aumann 1995 henceforth A , we acknowledge that A is w x w x not transparent. Here we reply to B , and also explain the analysis of A w x in verbal, conceptual terms, covering some points not covered in A .
Section 1 responds to Binmore's criticism of our definition of rationality. w x Sections 2 and 3 clear up two fundamental misunderstandings in B . Sections 4 through 7 discuss the proof of our Theorem A; Section 6 makes a point of general methodological interest; Section 8 discusses the proof of Theorem B. Section 9 reformulates our results in terms of ordinary Ž Bayesian rationality rather than the weaker form of rationality used in w x. A . w x 1. B 's primary point concerns our definition of ''rationality''. Roughly, this specifies that a player i is rational if and only if it is not the case that Ž he knows that he would be able to do better for the precise definition, w x . please see A , p. 9 .
Binmore questions the ordering of the words in this definition. He suggests two different emendations. In the first, i is rational if and only if he knows that he would not be able to do better. The second calls for a standard Bayesian framework, with utilities and probabilities; this enables us to apply the standard definition, according to which a player is rational if and only if he would be unable to increase his expected utility.
Leaving aside the merits of these two definitions, let us say at once that w x with either one, both theorems of A remain true without any change. w x To see why, call the three forms of rationality, respectively, A -rationalw x w x ity, B -rationality, and Bayes rationality. Of the three, A -rationality is the Ž . w x weakest easiest to achieve and B -rationality the strongest, while Bayes w x rationality is between the two. That is to say, every B -rational choice is w x Bayes rational, and every Bayes rational choice is A -rational. Therefore, Ž . w x w x common knowledge CK of B -rationality implies CK of A -rationality; w x and, also, CK of Bayes rationality implies CK of A -rationality. But by w x w x Theorem A of A , CK of A -rationality implies backward induction.
Therefore CK of either of the other two forms of rationality implies Ž . backward induction BI . In the other direction, one may verify directly, as w x w x Ž . in A , that CK of B -rationality and a fortiori of Bayes rationality is possible in every perfect information game.
We agree with Binmore that Bayes rationality is the most natural and w x straightforward of the three. We nevertheless favored A -rationality, for several reasons. One is that it yields a stronger result; that is, the result w x with A -rationality implies that with Bayes rationality, but not the other way around. Another is that this strength is obtained at no extra cost. In fact it is cheaper, because working with Bayes rationality requires the explicit introduction of probabilities, which just complicate the system without serving any essential purpose. Finally, justifying the standard Bayesian framework requires an axiom system such as that of Savage Ž . 1954 . While we ourselves have no problem with this, there are others who do; so we felt it preferable to avoid implicitly assuming axioms that really have nothing to do with the matter at hand.
In brief, our result says that CK of an extremely weak form of rationality already implies BI; a fortiori this is so for stronger forms of rationality, including the standard Bayesian form.
1 w x The gist of this discussion appears already in A, 4c and Footnote 4 . To avoid future misunderstandings, we present a formal treatment in Section 9 below. w x 2. On a more conceptual level: B opens with the sentence, ''It now seems to be generally accepted that rational players would not necessarily use their backward induction strategies if there were to be a deviation from the backward induction path.'' Apparently, Binmore sees some kind w x of inconsistency or contradiction between this and the results of A . w x In fact, there is no inconsistency. We agree wholeheartedly with B 's first sentence. Indeed, we go further: even if there has been no deviation from the backward induction path up to some point, a rational player may well deviate at that point. A rational player may even deviate from the backward induction path at the very first move of the game. We have said w x this repeatedly. Thus A, p. 18 : '' . . . the inductive choice may be not only Ž . unreasonable and unwise, but quite simply irrational;'' and Aumann 1992 w x shows that in the centipede game adduced in B , it may be incumbent on rational players to ''stay in'' until quite late in the game.
Our results concern a situation with CK of rationality, not just rationality. Binmore continuously confounds these concepts, using them almost 1 w x Footnote 3 of B acknowledges this, but dismisses it for reasons that we do not understand.
interchangeably. Here and there he pays lip service to CK of rationality Ž . CKR ; but substantively he argues as if only simple rationality were assumed. Needless to say, our argument will not work in such an environment. We do make essential use of CKR.
3.
Another error of Binmore is his failure to distinguish between the w x subjunctive and indicative moods. In A, 5f , we wrote w x These are not just empty words; they lie at the heart not only of A 's conceptual approach, but also of its formal treatment. A strategy of a player is defined as a function that assigns an action to each of his vertices, reached or not; the rationality of a player is defined in terms of his rationality at each of his vertices; and this, in turn, is defined in terms of what he knows about the others players' strategies. Thus in deciding whether a player i is rational when choosing down in the centipede game, we do explicitly take into account what i knows or thinks about what the 2 Our intention could not have been made clearer. The indicative mood is heavily stressed:
''are actually reached.'' '' Are''; not ''would'', not ''were to be''. For the case that somebody might still misunderstand, the word ''actually'' is thrown in. And if, by some stretch of the Ž imagination, somebody might still misunderstand, our very next sentence not cited by . Binmore would surely clear things up: ''Under CKR, vertices off the backward induction path cannot be reached; and when CKR does not obtain, the results do not apply.'' Ž . Binmore calls * oxymoronic. That is beyond our comprehension. Why can't vertices off the BI path actually be reached? To be sure, they can't be reached under CKR, as we say explicitly in the very next sentence. But why can't they be reached when CKR does not obtain? And if Binmore had somehow understood that we were implicitly assuming CKR in Ž . * , surely the very next sentence should have disabused him. other player would have done if i had gone across. Binmore is 180Њ off the mark.
4.
Though Binmore makes an unconvincing case, the malaise that he evinces is not totally groundless. We believe our analysis to be both conceptually and formally sound; but it is not straightforward, and we are grateful for this opportunity to elucidate it. This and the next section w x discuss Theorem A of A , according to which CKR implies BI; Theorem B is treated in Section 6.
To start with, one really must differentiate very sharply between ratio-Ž . nality and CKR see Section 2 above . That a player is rational at a verteẍ means that his choices at¨and at his subsequent vertices maximize his expected payoff given his beliefs 3 at¨. In forming his beliefs at¨, the player may take into account whatever he wishes. In particular, he may w x take into account the actions of other players at previous moves A, 5d . w x Ž . Thus in B 's centipede game, Player II P2 may, at his first vertex, play across for precisely the reason that Binmore adduces: that noting that Ž . Player I P1 played across at her first vertex, he estimates that she will play across again. P1, in turn, may take this into account when making her first move, so that she may well wish to play across at her first move. In fact, it makes no difference how the players form their beliefs; as long as their actions maximize their expected payoffs, they are rational. As a result, rational players may well play across for a very long time in the w x centipede game. We have said this again and again, both here and in A , but apparently one cannot say it often enough. w x But Theorem A of A assumes not only that the players are rational; it assumes also that this is common knowledge. In particular, P1 knows that Ž . if P2's last vertex were reached, he would play down subjunctive! . She knows this for sure, without a shadow of a doubt, because she knows that P2 is rational. Therefore, if P1's last vertex were reached, she would play down. Now P2 knows that P1 is rational, and he knows that she knows that he is rational. So he knows what we just concluded: that if her last vertex were reached, she would play down. He knows this for sure, without a shadow of a doubt. Therefore, if his next-to-last vertex were reached, he, being rational, would play down. And so on, until we conclude that P1 plays down at her first vertex.
The point is that while the beliefs of a rational player might motivate him to play across, they don't ha¨e to. The assumption of CKR gives usᎏand the playersᎏadditional information, information that enables us to conclude that each player would go down at each of his vertices¨, if that vertex were reached.
5. ''But,'' the reader may ask, ''something still bothers me. You have proved that under CKR, P1 must go down at the first vertex. You did this by working you way backward from the last vertex, showing that at each vertex¨, the player at¨would have to go down if¨were reached. Very good. Having proved this, you know it, I know it, and the players know it. Now let's reexamine the proof. P1 must go down at her first vertex. In deciding on this, she must take the alternatives into account. You yourself w x Ž . stressed this, both in A and above Section 3 . So P1 must ask herself, what would happen if she went across? Well, we know that under CKR, she can't go across; we've proved that. So if she did go across, she would be demonstrating that CKR does not obtain. It would then be illegitimate to use the conclusions of CKR also insofar as they apply to the second vertex; that is, it would be illegitimate to conclude that P2 would necessarily go down at the second vertex. So, he might go across. In that case, P1 would prefer to go across at the first vertex. So the proof that CKR implies down at the first vertex, which looked good at first, breaks down on reexamination. It carries within it the seeds of its own destruction.'' 6. Before responding to this substantively, we make a methodological point. It is difficult to evaluate the validity of this kind of contorted reasoning using verbal tools only. That is a function of mathematical formalisms. In a formal model the conclusions are derived from definitions and assumptions. Once one is satisfied that the derivation is mathematically correct, it remains only to examine the appropriateness of the definitions and assumptions. But with informal, verbal reasoning as complex as the above, one never knows for sure whether the argument is sound. One can argue until one is blue in the face, without convincing one another, because there is no criterion for deciding the soundness of an informal argument. w x So we say, gentle reader, it is indeed possible that the conclusions of A are unsound; but if so, that can only be for one of two reasons: either there is a mathematical error in our proof, or one of our definitions or assumptions is conceptually inappropriate. No one has challenged the w x correctness of our mathematics. B does challenge the appropriateness of our definition of rationality; we respond in Sections 1 above and 9 below. We welcome other challenges to our definitions or assumptions. But the w x kind of verbal argument typified by most of B , and by Section 5 above, concerns the reasoning process, the process of drawing conclusions from assumptions; and in a matter of this complexity, that is better left to the mathematics.
7. Nevertheless, we now respond to the question in Section 5 within the same informal genre. The error in the argument is that it mixes the conclusion of the proof 4 into the proof itself. That is not legitimate. Suppose we have proved a theorem of the form '' p implies q.'' But our hypothetical reader is skeptical. ''The proof sounds right,'' he says, ''but let's look again. Assume p. Perhaps, after all, this could jibe with 'not q.' So suppose that it doesᎏi.e., that q does not obtain. But then, since we have proved that p implies q, it cannot be that p obtains. So we conclude that after all, p doesn't obtain. But if p doesn't obtain, we no longer have grounds for concluding q. So your proof doesn't hold up under examinationᎏyou'll have to abandon it.'' Clearly, this argument is absurd. But that is exactly the argument in Section 5. Starting with CKR, we prove that P1 goes down at the first vertex. Now, we say, let's try it again. Must P1 really go down at the first vertex? Let's suppose notᎏi.e., that she goes across. But then we have a contradiction to CKR, and anything whatever follows from a contradiction! So we must abandon CKR. But then there is no longer any reason to go down at the first vertex.
Just as clearly, this argument is absurd.
8.
We come now to Theorem B, which says that CKR is possible in every perfect information game. Here we do not assume CKR; we want to prove that it is possible, for appropriate choices of moves and information. The proof is simple: just let each player make his inductive choice at each of his vertices¨, if¨is reached, and stipulate that this be commonly known. It is easily verified that CKR then indeed obtains.
In the centipede game, for example, we stipulate that each player play down at each vertex, if reached, and that this be commonly known. CKR then follows.
9.
As promised in Section 1, we now provide a formal account of the w x results of A using Bayes rationality rather than the very weak version of w x Ž w x . rationality used in A called A -rationality in Section 1 . We freely use w x the terminology, notation, and results of A . Bayes rationality is here defined in ''ex-post'' termsᎏwhat i would think 8 if¨were reached, rather than in ''ex ante'' termsᎏwhat he w x thinks at the beginning of the game. The formal development in A uses w x 9 the ex ante definition, because in the context of A , it is weaker, and so 10 w x yields a stronger version of Theorem A; see A, 5e . But in the current Bayesian context, ex ante rationality is neither weaker nor stronger than Ž . w x nor equivalent to ex post rationality. As explained in A, 5e , ex post rationality seems more relevant than ex ante rationality. Therefore, since in the current context, the ex post result does not follow from the ex ante one, use of the ex post definition is indicated here. We stress, though, that this applies to rationality as such only; ''knowledge'' and ''common knowledge'' remain ex ante, i.e., refer to the beginning of the game.
7 This is a technical note, which may be ignored without affecting the understanding of the rest of the paper. 8 The term ''think'' is meant to encompass both ''know'' and ''attribute probability.'' 9 w x w x That is, ex post A -rationality implies ex ante A -rationality. 10 A weaker hypothesis means a stronger result.
